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I. INTRODUCTION
It creates a feeling of unreality to write a contribution in a tribute
publication for a dear colleague, who was above all a good friend and who
left us totally unexpectedly a little more than a year ago. I knew Gabriel for
many years. If my recollection is correct, it was in the early Gorbachev
period that he asked me to lecture in the Brussels Seminar on the legal
framework governing relations between the European Community and
Eastern Europe. At the time, we were all thrilled about what was going on
beyond the Iron Curtain. Certainly, among the many classic themes of
European Community law at the Brussels Seminar, my intervention was
somewhat exotic. However, slowly but surely, it became a well-established
chapter in the annual meetings in Brussels. Moreover, my topic would later
evolve to become “The EU Enlargement” while, after 2004, it even became
“The Enlarged EU and its Neighbourhood.” Gabriel, in fact, also wanted me
to include the relations between the EU and Russia, Turkey, and the Western
Balkans. Gabriel was always present among the Seminar’s participants each
year, and he was genuinely interested in everything that was taking place on
the European continent. In particular, the EU’s enlargement process and its
implications for the EU’s proximity policy struck a sensitive chord for him.
A presentation at the Brussels Seminar always ended in an after-lecture drink
or meal, during which we further explored the potential for and limits of the
EU’s policy making. Gabriel often asked me to travel to Athens, Georgia, as
a visiting professor at the University of Georgia School of Law, to explain
these important European complexities to American law students.
Unfortunately, I was only once able to come, and I must confess that now I
deeply regret not being with him in Athens more often, as I have an excellent
memory of my stay there. It was my first teaching experience in the U.S.,
and I was very impressed with the excellent academic atmosphere, the
students’ eagerness to learn about Europe, Professor Sohn’s legendary black
desk (which I was allowed to use during my stay), and so many other
things—but above all, the warm hospitality of Gabriel and Gisèle.
In the last Brussels Seminar I taught—the 2009 session—I briefly
touched on the relations between the EU and Switzerland, and Gabriel was
deeply fascinated by the uniqueness of that relationship. How could a
European State in the heart of the European Union survive without being an
EU member? I had the intention, and I promised Gabriel to include a more
structured form of this special aspect of the EU’s proximity relations in the
2010 Brussels Seminar. Sadly enough, instead of a presentation on this topic
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at the Seminar, I have prepared a contribution in the Dean Wilner Tribute
Issue.
II. BACKGROUND AND OVERVIEW OF THE BILATERAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK
The legal framework of EU–Switzerland relations is particularly complex
and not easy to summarize.1 The reasons are diverse. In the first place, there
is the Byzantine complexity of the EU’s external decision-making process
and of the legal structure of the EU’s external relations—something that has
increased considerably since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty. But
there is, of course, also Switzerland’s own specificity. Switzerland is not
only one of the few countries fully enclosed in the heart of the EU, it is also a
very important trade partner of the EU. Switzerland has concluded by far the
largest number of bilateral sectoral agreements with the EU (more than
120).2 Switzerland’s membership in the European Free Trade Association
(EFTA), but its lacking membership in the European Economic Area3 and its
customs and monetary union with Liechtenstein, add a special perspective to
this specificity. In addition, Switzerland’s constitutional system, with its
direct democracy and system of popular referenda, as well as its neutrality,
are elements that impact its relations with the EU, but that, unfortunately, are
not examined in this contribution.
As a result of the specific geographical position of Switzerland, the
European Community rapidly accepted the idea that bilateral sectoral ad hoc
agreements with Switzerland were necessary after the establishment of the
1
For a comprehensive overview of the legal framework of bilateral relations between the
EU and Switzerland, see Christine Kaddous, The Relations Between the EU and Switzerland,
in LAW AND PRACTICE OF EU EXTERNAL RELATIONS 227, 227–69 (Alan Dashwood & Marc
Maresceau eds., 2010). For an overview of the political background of this relationship, see
RENE SCHWOK, SWITZERLAND–EUROPEAN UNION: AN IMPOSSIBLE MEMBERSHIP? (Lisa GodinRoger trans., 2009).
2
For a recent overview, see Les accords bilatéraux Suisse-Union européenne, Septembre
2011 Bureau d’intégration, Département fédéral des affaires étrangères, Bern, available at
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/document/activities/cont/201003/20100315ATT70636/201003
15ATT70636EN.pdf. For a list of the bilateral agreements (Sept. 2005) see Accords
bilatéraux II Suisse–UE et autres Accords récents, 929–46 (Christine Kaddous & Monique
Jametti Greiner eds., 2006). See also Christa Töbler, Jeroen Hardenbol & Balázs Mellár,
Internal Market Beyond the EU: The EEA and Switzerland, Directorate-General for Internal
Politics, European Parliament (2010) PE 429.993, available at http://www.europa.admin.ch/di
enstleistungen/00553/index.html?lang=fr.
3
See infra p. 732.
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European Economic Community (EEC). By the 1960s, various agreements
of this nature had already been concluded; for instance, agreements on clocks
and watches4 and on certain cheeses,5 but the first bilateral agreement of a
more comprehensive nature was no doubt the 1972 Agreement Between the
European Economic Community and the Swiss Confederation (1972
Agreement) which basically aimed at establishing free trade for industrial
products.6 This Agreement was one of a series of agreements that the EEC
signed with all the EFTA Member States before the 1973 accession of the
two EFTA States—the U.K. and Denmark—to the European Community.
The 1972 Agreement with Switzerland, which has been the main legal basis
for the development of mutual trade relations, is still in force today and
remains an important framework for mutual trade.7 It must be said that it has
even gained new momentum as a result of a sharp divergence in the
4
These agreements were not published in the Official Journal of the European Communities;
they were later amended and the amendments were published in the Official Journal.
Amendment of the Additional Agreement to the Agreement Concerning Products of the Clock
and Watch Industry Between the European Economic Community and its Member States and the
Swiss Confederation, 1977 O.J. (C 253) 1; Amendment of the Additional Agreement to the
Agreement Concerning Products of the Clock and Watch Industry Between the European
Economic Community and its Member States and the Swiss Confederation, 1986, 1987 O.J.
(C 94) 1. The agreements have been published in the Swiss Recueil systématique du droit
fédéral, Accord du 30 juin 1967 concernant les produits horlogers entre la Confédération suisse
et la Communauté économique européenne ainsi que ses Etats membres, available at http://
www.admin.ch/ch/f/rs/c0_632_290_13.html; Accord complémentaire du 20 juillet 1972 à
l’Accord concernant les produits horlogers entre la Confédération suisse et la CEE ainsi que les
Etats membres, available at http://www.admin.ch/ch/f/rs/c0_632_290_131.html.
5
Tariff Agreement with Switzerland, Negotiated Under Article XXVIII of GATT,
Concerning Certain Cheeses Falling Within Heading ex 04.04 of the Common Customs
Tariff, June 29, 1967, 1969 O.J. (L 257) 5. The implementation of that agreement was later
modified by Commission Regulation 3048/87, Sept. 9, 1987, 1987 O.J. (L 289) 18, now
replaced by Agreement Between the European Community and the Swiss Confederation on
Trade in Agricultural Products, Concessions Regarding Cheeses, Annex 3, 2002 (L 114) 148.
6
Agreement Between the European Economic Community and the Swiss Confederation,
July 22, 1972, 1972 O.J. (L 300) 189 [hereinafter 1972 Agreement].
7
The 1972 Agreement aimed at progressively eliminating the obstacles to substantially all
trade regarding products falling within Chapters 25 through 99 of the Brussels Nomenclature,
but it did not apply to agricultural products (which are within Chapters 1 through 24 of the
Brussels Nomenclature). In 1999, within the Bilaterals I (see infra p. 733), the Agreement
Between the European Community and the Swiss Confederation on Trade in Agricultural
Products (2002 O.J. (L 114) 132) was signed which constitutes an important complement to
the 1972 Agreement. Within the Bilaterals II package (see infra p. 734), the Agreement as
regards Provisions Applicable to Processed Agricultural Products, 2005 O.J. (L 23) 19,
amending the 1972 Agreement, was concluded.
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interpretation of the Agreement’s provisions on state aid. The European
Commission believes that certain tax regulations applied by Swiss cantons
with regard to holding companies, mixed and management companies,
offering tax advantages to companies established in Switzerland for profits
generated in the EU, are a violation of Article 23 of the 1972 Agreement.8
This provision states that “any public aid which distorts or threatens to
distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of
certain goods” is “incompatible with the proper functioning of the
Agreement in so far as [it] may affect trade between the [European]
Community and Switzerland.”9
According to the European Commission, these tax advantages “are not
related to specific investments which could justify granting an advantage to
compensate for specific costs incurred by the beneficiaries but, instead,
constitute a reduction of charges that should normally be borne by the firms
concerned in the course of their business.”10 They are, therefore, forms of
aid which, in its view, are “public operating aid” and “discriminate against
multinational enterprises which do not establish their holding or management
activities in Switzerland.”11 For this reason, a considerable number of
multinational companies have decided to relocate their headquarters from the
EU to Switzerland.12 The Swiss response to the EU’s interpretation of
Article 23 is that Switzerland is not a part of the EU’s Internal Market and
that the EU interpretation of the competition rules, including those on state
aid, are not applicable in Switzerland.13
In addition, in the Swiss view, the 1972 Agreement only covers trade of
certain goods and cannot be a proper legal basis for judging company
8

Commission Decision, Incompatibility of Certain Swiss Company Tax Regimes of 13
February 2007, C (2007) 411 final, not published in the Official Journal.
9
1972 Agreement, supra note 6, art. 23, para. 1.
10
Commission Decision, supra note 8, para. 57.
11
Id. para. 46.
12
See, e.g., Maija Palmer & Ben Fenton, Yahoo Set to Move European HQ from London to
Geneva, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 14, 2008, at 1; Lake Geneva Goes Bananas, SWISSINFO.CH (July 26,
2008), http://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/business/Lake_Geneva_goes_bananas.html?cid=6822842;
Julia Kollewe, McDonald’s to Move European Head Office to Switzerland, GUARDIAN (U.K.)
(July 13, 2009), http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2009/jul/13/mcdonalds-headquarters-movegeneva; Simon Goodley et al., Cadbury’s Secret Swiss Move Will Cost UK Exchequer Millions
in Tax, GUARDIAN (U.K.), Dec. 3, 2010, at 1.
13
For a summary of the Swiss position, see Tax Issues, SWISS CONFEDERATION: FEDERAL
DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, http://www.europa.admin.ch/themen/00499/00503/00567/
index.html?lang=en (last visited Aug. 20, 2011).
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taxation laws. The dispute settlement procedure foreseen in this Agreement
does not provide for a smooth outcome of this controversy since it is up to
the Joint Committee to put an end to the conflict, which implies “mutual
agreement” between the parties (pursuant to Article 30, paragraph 2 of the
Agreement).14 Logically enough, the Joint Committee has so far been unable
to take such a decision. From a strictly legal point of view, however, the EU
could have considered unilaterally adopting safeguard measures (a
possibility foreseen in Article 27, paragraph 3 of the Agreement)15 but this
was probably a bridge too far, and until now, diplomatic channels have been
followed trying to solve the matter, yet without success. Recently, the
Council (of Ministers) of the EU expressed renewed concern about these tax
regimes, regretting “the lengthy dialogue on this issue [which] has not yet led
to an abolition of the state aid aspects of these regimes.”16 This controversy
needs to be kept in mind when attempting to make a global assessment of the
bilateral relations.
Another important issue for the EU–Switzerland relations was the EC’s
initiative on the Completion of the Internal Market. This was one of the
major EC policy programs launched in the second half of the 1980s that
aimed to achieve an area without borders with free movement of goods,
persons, services, and capital by 1992.17 Needless to say, this project
seriously affected the EC’s EFTA partners, as close neighbors of the Internal
Market, and this explains why in the course of implementation of this
project, the idea of a European Economic Area (EEA) was also launched to
establish an Internal Market between the EC and the EFTA countries. In
1992, during the final phase of the preparation of the conclusion of the EEA
Agreement, Switzerland even formally applied for EU membership.18
However, a few months afterwards in a popular referendum, the Swiss
population refused to approve the EEA Agreement.19 As a result of the
collapse of the EEA option for Switzerland and the “freezing” of its
application for EU membership, it was indispensable—there was simply no

14

1972 Agreement, supra note 6, art. 23, para. 2.
Id. art. 27, para. 3.
16
General Affairs Council of the European Union, Council Conclusions on EU Relations
with EFTA Countries, para. 44 (Dec. 14, 2010), available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/
uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/118458.pdf
17
See Completing the Internal Market, COM (1985) 310 final.
18
Switzerland applied for membership on May 20, 1992.
19
The unexpected outcome of this referendum was 50.3% against the EEA, 49.7% in favor.
15
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other alternative—to organize the bilateral relations in a sectoral manner.
However, instead of further progressing exclusively on an agreement-byagreement approach, the idea arose to work through negotiating “packages.”
Fortunately, this package method proved to be workable and flexible enough
to cope with the most pressing issues in the bilateral relations. Through
clusters of bilateral sectoral agreements, complex and delicate negotiation
packages were formed that allowed the EU and Switzerland to move
forward. No doubt, the agreements that resulted from this process are much
better than no agreements at all and the method followed in this process has
also made it possible to reach a wide range of different areas. Although
considerable cherry-picking took place on both sides, this process led to an
improved global equilibrium in mutual relations. The same result would
most likely not have been obtained if the negotiations were conducted on a
purely individual basis. Regrouping in bilateral negotiations, a great variety
of different agreements made it possible to more easily create compromises
between the parties.
The first package of agreements, known as the Bilaterals I, signed in
1999 and entered into force in 2002, was composed of seven sectoral
agreements covering free movement of persons, transport over land, air
transport, public procurement markets, elimination of technical barriers to
trade, research, and agriculture.20 The eye-catcher was the Agreement on the
Free Movement of Persons as requested by the EC.21 More than one million
EU citizens live in Switzerland (amid a population of slightly more than 6
million Swiss citizens) and over 200,000 EU nationals (“les frontaliers”)
cross the border daily to work in Switzerland.22 This agreement was the sole
“mixed agreement” of the package; that is, from the EU’s side, an agreement
that the EC and its Member States sign. As a consequence of this “mixity,”
EU enlargement, after the entry into force of the Bilaterals I, required Swiss
approval for the application of the Agreement on the Free Movement of
Persons to the new EU Member States. For the EU enlargements of 2004

20

For text of these agreements, see 2002 O.J. (L 114) 1 [hereinafter Bilaterals I].
Agreement Between the European Community and its Member States, of the One Part,
and the Swiss Confederation, of the Other, on the Free Movement of Persons, June 21, 1999,
2002 O.J. (L 114) 6 [hereinafter Agreement on the Free Movement of Persons].
22
For recent statistical data, see Communiqué de presse, Département fédéral de l’intérieur
DFI, Office fédéral de la statistique, Confédération Suisse, 7 March 2011, http://www.bfs.admi
n.ch/bfs/portal/fr/index/themen/03/22/press.html. In 2010 approximately 231,000 “frontaliers”/
“frontalières” worked in Switzerland.
21
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and 2007, Switzerland agreed to extend the Free Movement of Persons
Agreement through popular referendum.23 The various agreements of the
Bilaterals I were, notwithstanding their great diversity, interconnected
through the famous “guillotine clause,” which stipulated that all the
agreements had to enter into force simultaneously and would collectively
terminate should any individual agreement be terminated.24
Of course, it is not the place here to examine the agreements
individually,25 but soon after their signature, initiatives were launched for a
new series of agreements called the Bilaterals II.26 A number of agreements
were not included in the Bilaterals I and were considered “leftovers,” while
for some new areas, additional bilateral agreements were suggested. On the
whole, the negotiations for the Bilaterals II again covered a wide range of
topics such as environment, education, statistics, MEDIA, processed
agricultural products, pension, and services, but the most sensitive topics
were the EU’s requests for an agreement on taxation on savings income and
an agreement on the fight against fraud in the area of indirect taxation.
Switzerland for its part demanded to be associated with the activities of the
Schengen and Dublin Conventions establishing co-operation in the fields of

23

The additional protocol regarding the 2004 EU enlargement was approved on September
25, 2005 by a majority of 56%. Votation populaire du 25 septembre 2005, SWISS
CONFEDERATION, http://www.admin.ch/ch/f//pore/va//20050925/index.html (last visited Aug,
20, 2011). On February 8, 2009, the extension of the Agreement on Free Movement of
Persons to Bulgaria and Romania was approved in a referendum by a majority of 59.6%.
Votation populaire du 8 février 2009, SWISS CONFEDERATION, http://www.admin.ch/ch/f//po
re/va//20090208/index.html (last visited Aug. 20, 2011).
24
See, e.g., Agreement on the Free Movement of Persons, supra note 21, art. 25.
25
For a thorough analysis of the Bilaterals I, see ACCORDS BILATÉRAUX SUISSE - UNION
EUROPÉENNE (Daniel Felder & Christine Kaddous eds., 2001); Stephan Breitenmoser, Sectoral
Agreements Between the EC and Switzerland: Contents and Context, 40 COMMON MKT. L.
REV. 1137 (2003).
26
The most important agreements of the Bilaterals II are: Agreement on Participation of
Switzerland in the European Environment Agency and European Information and Observation
Network, 2004 O.J. (L 90) 37; Agreement Regarding Provisions Applicable to Processed
Agricultural Products, 2005 O.J. (L 23) 19; Agreement on Cooperating in Field of Statistics,
2006 O.J. (L 90) 2; MEDIA Agreements, 2006 O.J. (L 90) 23, and 2007 O.J. (L 303) 9;
Agreement on the Swiss Confederation’s Association with the Implementation, Application
and Development of the Schengen Acquis, 2008 O.J. (L 53) 1; Agreement Concerning the
Criteria and Mechanisms for Establishing the State Responsible for Examining a Request for
Asylum Lodged in a Member State or in Switzerland, 2008 O.J. (L 53) 5; Cooperation
Agreement to Combat Fraud and Any Other Legal Activity to the Detriment of the Financial
Interests of the Parties, 2009 O.J. (L 46) 6.
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justice, police, asylum, and migration.27 While the Swiss authorities insisted
on parallelism in the negotiations, this was not the case for ratification,
conclusion, and entry into force of the agreements making up the package,
and the various agreements were disconnected from each other.28
Consequently, contrary to the Bilaterals I, the agreements of the Bilaterals II
did not include the “guillotine clause.” Certainly, the EU request for cooperation by Switzerland regarding taxation of savings income was a
particularly difficult matter, the more so since the EU had made the entry
into force of its own Council Directive 2003/48/EC on Taxation of Savings
Income in the Form of Interest Payments,29 dependent on the entry into force
of an agreement with Switzerland (and the four small States: Liechtenstein,
San Marino, Monaco, and Andorra), applying “measures equivalent to those
contained in this Directive.”30 In other words, one of the most important EU
Directives in the field of fiscal policy establishing the principle of
information exchange regarding EU residents’ bank accounts in other EU
Member States than the Member State of residence, needed, as a conditio
sine qua non, co-operation by Switzerland. Of course, such a demand was
not without danger for the Swiss sacrosanct bank secrecy principle, but
Switzerland also rapidly understood that “a war” with the EU on such a
sensitive topic could not be won and should be avoided by all means. In
2003, a political compromise between the EU and Switzerland was reached
and was formalized in the 2004 Agreement Providing for Measures
Equivalent to those Laid Down in Council Directive 2003/48/EC on
Taxation of Savings Income in the Form of Interest Payments.31 The
Agreement did not establish automatic exchange of information and thus the
Swiss bank secrecy principle had been safeguarded.32 On their part, the
27

See infra pp. 752–53.
This explains why the agreements of the Bilaterals II, contrary to those of the Bilaterals
I, have different dates for their conclusion and entry into force.
29
Council Directive 2003/48/EC of 3 June 2003 on Taxation of Savings Income in the
Form of Interest Payments, 2003 O.J. (L 157) 38 [hereinafter EU Savings Directive].
30
Id. art. 17, para. 2.
31
Agreement Providing for Measures Equivalent to Those Laid Down in Council Directive
2003/48/EC on Taxation of Savings Income in the Form of Interest Payments, 2004 O.J. (L 358)
30 [hereinafter 2004 Agreement on Taxation of Savings Income]. For more details, see Marc
Maresceau, Bilateral Agreements Concluded by the European Community, in 309 COLLECTED
COURSES OF THE HAGUE ACADEMY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 416, 416–19 (2004).
32
It is not the purpose of this Article to go into the details of the Swiss bank secrecy laws
which are under increasing pressure from the U.S. and EU Member States but it is perhaps useful
to recall that in 2009, Switzerland agreed to cooperate concerning a request for information from
28
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Swiss authorities agreed to introduce “equivalent measures,” consisting of a
system of tax retention, to be introduced in different phases. In the third and
last phase of this arrangement, 35% tax on savings income is to be imposed
on EU account holders in Switzerland. Exchange of information is only
foreseen for conduct constituting tax fraud or the like under the laws of the
requested State; in other words, it is Swiss law which determines the
meaning of “tax fraud” in Switzerland and not that of the requesting State.
It should also be noted that after the Swiss rejection of the EEA initiative,
EU–Switzerland relations did not exclusively develop through the Bilaterals
I and II. Various ad hoc bilateral agreements were also concluded, such as,
inter alia, agreements on Swiss participation in certain EU Missions (e.g.,
the Aceh Monitoring Mission (Indonesia),33 the EU Police Missions in the

the U.S. Internal Revenue Service regarding UBS (Agreement Between the United States of
America and the Swiss Confederation, Aug. 19, 2009, available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-dr
op/us-swiss_government_agreement.pdf) but further actions against Swiss bank secrecy are not
to be excluded (see Haig Simonian, Swiss and US to Clash Again on Bank Secrecy, FIN. TIMES,
Sept. 5, 2011, at 3; Haig Simonian, Swiss Pressed over Secret Accounts, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 10,
2011, at 12. The pressure from the U.S. on Switzerland has also inspired some EU Member
States to negotiate bilateral tax cooperation agreements with Switzerland. For example, on
October 6, 2011 the UK signed a taxation cooperation agreement with Switzerland providing
inter alia for taxation of UK bank account holders in Switzerland while preserving the bank
secrecy principle. Haig Simonian & Norma Cohen, UK in Tax Deal over Swiss Bank Accounts,
FIN. TIMES (Aug. 24, 2011), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/df9d4d9e-ce6d-11e0-b755-00144fe
abdc0.html#axzz1gvTZyqjf; text of the Agreement, available at http://www.news.admin.ch/NS
BSubscriber/message/attachments/24483.pdf. Before the signature of the UK–Switzerland
agreement, Germany had already signed on September 21, 2001 a taxation cooperation
agreement.
Abkommen zwischen der Schweizerischen Eidgenossenschaft und der
Bundesrepublik Deutschland über Zusammenarbeit in den Bereichen Steuern und Finanzmarkt,
Sept. 21, 2011, available at http://www.news.admin.ch/NSBSubscriber/message/attachments/24
360.pdf). More EU Member States, inspired by these bilateral agreements, are currently
negotiating taxation cooperation agreements with Switzerland (for example Greece) but others,
such as France, have refused to follow the UK and German example. See, e.g., La France refuse
de céder aux avances de la Suisse sur l’évasion fiscal, LE MONDE (Aug. 19, 2011), http://generat
ion.lemonde.fr/politique/article/2011/08/18/la-france-refuse-de-ceder-aux-avances-de-la-suisse-s
ur-l-evasion-fiscale_1560811_823448.html). However, the recent bilateral agreements with the
UK and Germany are currently examined by the European Commission for possible breaches of
EU law, in particular, the EU Savings Directive, supra note 29, and 2004 Agreement on
Taxation of Savings Income, see supra, note 31. See Alex Barker, UK and German Tax Deals
with Swiss Anger Brussels, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 28, 2011, at 1.
33
Council Decision 2005/966 CFSP, of 14 November 2005 Concerning the Conclusion of
an Agreement Between the European Union and the Swiss Confederation on the Participation
of the Swiss Confederation in the European Union Monitoring Mission in Aceh (Indonesia)
(Aceh Monitoring Mission — AMM), 2005 O.J. (L 349) 30.
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Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia,34 in Bosnia and Herzegovina,35 the
Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX)).36 Switzerland also participates
in a number of Community Programmes37 and some specific bilateral
agreements have further been concluded, for example, on procedures for the
exchange of classified information.38 In addition, Switzerland also agreed to
financially participate to reduce social and economic disparities in the
enlarged European Union. A Memorandum of Understanding with the EU
was signed for this purpose, where Switzerland agreed to finance projects in
the new EU Member States for a total of 645 million euro,39 an amount that
increased to 902 million euro after the accession of Bulgaria and Romania.40
Finally, though not examined further in this Article, Switzerland has a
policy of closely following the developments of the EU acquis (the
accumulated legislation, legal acts, and court decisions which constitute the
body of EU law), particularly regarding the Internal Market. Consequently,
even outside the bilateral agreement frameworks, Switzerland often adapts
its domestic law unilaterally to that of the Union.

34
Council Decision 2004/809/CFSP of 5 July 2004 Concerning the Conclusion of the
Agreement Between the European Union and the Swiss Confederation on the Participation of
the Swiss Confederation in the European Union Police Mission (EUPOL Proxima) in the
former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, 2004 O.J. (L 354) 77.
35
Agreement Between the European Union and the Government of the Swiss
Confederation, Represented by the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, on the
Participation of Switzerland in the European Union Police Mission (EUPM) in Bosnia and
Herzegovina (BiH), Dec. 11, 2002, , 2003 O.J. (L 239) 14.
36
Council Decision 2008/666/CFSP of 24 July 2008 Concerning the Conclusion of an
Agreement Between the European Union and the Swiss Confederation on the Participation of
the Swiss Confederation in the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo, EULEX
KOSOVO, 2008 O.J. (L 217) 24.
37
For example, Switzerland participates in MEDIA 2007, the Seventh Framework
Programme, and the Socrates, Leonardo, and Youth Programmes. See Kaddous, supra note 1,
at 239, 245–46, 249–50. Arrangements for such participation are often based on a specific
bilateral agreement.
38
Agreement Between the Swiss Confederation and the European Union on the Security
Procedures for the Exchange of Classified Information, Apr. 28, 2008, 2008 O.J. (L 181) 58.
39
See Press Release, EU and Switzerland to Sign Memorandum, IP/06/234, 6283/06 (Feb. 27,
2006), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/06/234&type=
HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en.
40
See Press Release, Signature of Memorandum of Understanding, Pres/08/188 (June 25,
2008), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=PRES/08/188&typ
e=HTML.
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III. ASSESSMENT OF THE CURRENT RELATIONSHIP
In September 2010, the Swiss Government published a comprehensive
report on Switzerland’s European Policy as a response to the postulate
submitted by National Counsellor Christa Markwalder, requesting the Swiss
Federal Council assess advantages and disadvantages of the various policy
instruments regarding Switzerland–EU relations, and make suggestions
regarding priorities, immediate measures, and next steps related to
Switzerland’s future European policy.41 In this report, the Swiss Federal
Council examines the following options: continuation of the bilateral
approach, but without concluding new agreements; continuation of the
bilateral approach, but combining with further sectoral development (in other
words, further amplifying the bilateral sectoral frameworks); creation of a
global institutional framework, including the creation of a horizontal solution
to manage and channel the bilateral relationships; accession to the EEA;
accession to the EU; or accession to the EU, but with certain exceptions
resulting from Switzerland’s specificity such as its neutrality, currency, tax
system, et cetera.42 The main message of the Federal Council is that, on the
whole, Switzerland is satisfied with the bilateral sectoral approach followed
thus far, and that in the present circumstances, the bilateral sectoral
agreements make it possible to safeguard Switzerland’s interest in Europe,
“namely preserving its freedom of action, its prosperity and its values.”43
Consequently, “the Federal Council [is in favor of maintaining] its
commitment to the consolidation and further development of the bilateral
agreements approach, which it currently regards as the most suitable
instrument for safeguarding Switzerland’s interests in Europe.”44
41
RAPPORT DU CONSEIL FÉDÉRAL SUR L’EVALUATION DE LA POLITIQUE EUROPÉENNE DE LA
SUISSE (2010), available at http://www.admin.ch/ch/f/ff/2010/6615.pdf. For a summary in
English, see SWISS CONFEDERATION: FEDERAL DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
SWITZERLAND’S EUROPEAN POLICY: AN OVERVIEW OF THE FEDERAL COUNCIL’S REPORT ON THE
EVALUATION OF SWITZERLAND’S EUROPEAN POLICY (2010), available at http://www.europa.adm
in.ch/dokumentation/00437/00460/01549/index.html?lang=en&download=NHzLpZeg7t,lnp6I0
NTU042l2Z6ln1ad1IZn4Z2qZpnO2Yuq2Z6gpJCDdoF8gGym162epYbg2c_JjKbNoKSn6A--.
42
SWISS CONFEDERATION: FEDERAL DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, supra note 41.
43
Id. at 15.
44
Id. (emphasis added). In her speech on November 15, 2010, at the Swiss Mission to the
EU, Brussels, Swiss Foreign Minister Micheline Calmy-Rey presented a mixed picture of the
current state of the bilateral relationship. While insisting that existing bilateral frameworks
allowed Switzerland to achieve its objectives in terms of prosperity and national security, she
felt that Swiss independence and sovereignty were under continued pressure since
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As already mentioned, the EU’s view is more nuanced. In its
Conclusions of December 14, 2010 on the relations with EFTA Countries,
the EU Council qualified the relations with Switzerland as “good, intensive
and broad”45 and previously, the Council had already recognized that the
sector-based bilateral agreements were a fruitful basis “for a wide-ranging
and productive co-operation.”46 However, it is also true that there is an
increasing strain on this method of conducting bilateral relations. The
reasons for the changing EU perception on the relations with Switzerland are
varied and relate to the EU’s enlargement and its own deepening,47 but also
to the growing and cumbersome sophistication of the bilateral mechanisms
set up with Switzerland over the years.48 EU–Switzerland relations occupy a
very specific position in the EU’s proximity policy as a whole.
The integration of EFTA countries in the EU’s Internal Market through
the EEA Agreement, their acceptance of a wide range of flanking and
accompanying policies, and the establishment of a solid institutional EEA
framework—in particular, through the work of the EEA Joint Committee—
have led to an exemplary incorporation record of the EU acquis in the legal
order of these countries, notwithstanding the fact that they remain non EU
members. The EU Council’s assessment of the relations with EFTA
countries within the EEA Agreement is outspoken and unambiguous: “the
Switzerland, as a non-EU member, “est de plus exposée à un risque élévé de discrimination
(tant économique que politique) d’où une réduction parfois importante de sa souveraineté
réelle.” (“Switzerland is becoming increasingly exposed to a high risk of discrimination
(economically as well as politcal) and hence to a reduction, sometimes considerably, of its real
sovereignty.”) ALLOCUTION DE MADAME LA CONSEILLÈRE FÉDÉRALE MICHELINE CALMY-REY
À L’OCCASION DE LA CÉLÉBRATION DES 50 ANS DE LA MISSION SUISSE AUPRÈS DES
INSTITUTIONS EUROPÉENNES 5 (Nov. 15, 2010).
45
General Affairs Council of the European Union, supra note 16, para. 37.
46
General Affairs Council of the European Union, Conclusions on EU Relations with
EFTA Countries, Dec. 8, 2008, para. 24.
47
Ambassador M. J. de Watteville, Head of the Swiss Mission to the EU, perfectly
summarized this state of affairs when he held that the EU has become a major actor on the
international scene and this affects its own priorities. The EU is therefore “moins disponible
pour traiter avec un pays comme le nôtre, alors qu’elle est devenue un partenaire encore plus
crucial pour la Suisse.” EXPOSÉ A L’OCCASION DE L’OUVERTURE DE L’ANNÉE ACADÉMIQUE DE
L’INSTITUT EUROPÉEN DE L’UNIVERSITÉ DE GENÈVE (2010).
48
See Herman Van Rompuy, President of the European Council, Remarks at the Joint Press
Conference with Doris Leuthard, President, Switz. (July 19, 2010) (emphasizing that there are
now sixty specific bilateral “working groups” monitoring the implementation of the many
agreements).
Valentina Pop, EU Looking to Reset Relations with Switzerland,
EUOBSERVER.COM (July 19, 2010), http://euobserver.com/18/30504.
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EEA countries have demonstrated an excellent record of proper and regular
incorporation of the acquis into their own legislation,”49 which is a
prerequisite for continued homogeneity of the Internal Market. In this
respect, it is noted by the Council, there is a smooth and well-functioning
surveillance system, through the excellent work of the EFTA Surveillance
Authority (ESA) and the EFTA Court.50
Unfortunately, the same cannot be said regarding the EU–Switzerland
relationship. Switzerland, notwithstanding its EFTA membership, rejected
the EEA model of integration.51 As already mentioned, bilateral relations
must have an ad hoc and sui generis sectoral basis as a result of this
rejection. Consequently, the integration of Switzerland into the EU acquis is
less comprehensive and more fragmented than that achieved through the
EEA model. As a result, in EU–Switzerland relations, legal certainty is less
guaranteed, and surveillance is more one-sided and less transparent than that
operating within the EEA framework. This is perhaps the main reason for
the increasing criticism within the EU as to how its relations with
Switzerland are organized. A growing issue at the bilateral level is the
question of the take-over by Switzerland of new EU acquis, in particular,
when this acquis concerns the Internal Market, including case-law of the
European Court of Justice52 and, naturally, the closely-related issue of
efficient supervision and enforcement of existing agreements, just
mentioned. At the time of writing this Article, the EU Council has in rather
direct language expressed the view that the current system of bilateral
agreements with Switzerland has become “unwieldy to manage and has
clearly reached its limits.”53 Consequently, the homogeneous interpretation
of the many bilateral agreements with Switzerland and the questions related
to an independent surveillance system, judicial enforcement mechanisms and
a dispute settlement mechanism, will need to be more adequately addressed.
Needless to say, these issues represent a full negotiating menu for the years

49
General Affairs Council of the European Union, supra note 16, para. 3; see also General
Affairs Council of the European Union, supra note 46, para. 2.
50
General Affairs Council of the European Union, supra note 16, para. 3.
51
See supra p. 732.
52
General Affairs Council of the European Union, supra note 16, para. 42.
53
Id. para. 48.
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to come, which will not only affect mutual bilateral relations, but may also
have repercussions on domestic Swiss politics and law.54
Different models on how to refer to the EU acquis and how to cope with
the developments of the law are found in existing EU–Switzerland
agreements. They provide a complex and diverse picture of various forms
and degrees of integration and/or cooperation. From a comparative
perspective, the following questions appear to be relevant: in principle, how
is the “acceptance” or “integration” by Switzerland of substantially identical
or similar provisions of the EU acquis organized? Are there specific
provisions on development of the law on “acceptance” or “integration” of
posterior legislation and posterior case-law of the Court of Justice? What
solutions are suggested if a conflict or imbalance persists, and is there an
adequate dispute settlement mechanism in case of such conflict or
imbalance? If so, at what level is the dispute solved? Is arbitration foreseen,
and if so, how is this organized? Is there a possibility for “compensation” if
the imbalance persists? Finally, how is “termination” of an agreement
organized? Again, it is impossible to provide an exhaustive analysis of all
these questions within this Article.55 In the following section, four different
54
It is interesting to note that on the same day as the publication of the Council’s Conclusions
on the EU’s Relations with EFTA Countries, December 14, 2010, the Swiss authorities reacted
with an Official Statement by the Integration Office FDFA/FDEA. After reiterating that the
present bilateral agreements with the EU “are working well,” the Integration Office responded to
certain specific EU comments and observed that an informal Swiss–EU working group was
currently discussing the possible horizontal institutional provisions of future bilateral
agreements, the models for adjusting the agreements to comply with new developments of EU
law, how to ensure coherent application and interpretation of future agreements, and how an
effective dispute settlement procedure could be set up. The Statement also underlined that
“[a]ny solution must respect the sovereignty of both parties and the efficient operation of their
institutions.” Statement, Integration Office FDFA/FDEA, Conclusions of the Council of the EU
on Relations with Switzerland (Dec. 14, 2010).
55
It should be added that also EU Member States may have bilateral disputes with
Switzerland and such disputes may sometimes have, be it only partially, an EU law
dimension. A rather unusual example of this was the dispute between Belgium and
Switzerland concerning the interpretation and application of Lugano Convention. Lugano
Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters,
Sept. 16, 1988, 28 I.L.M. 620 (1989). On December 21, 2009 this dispute was brought by the
Belgian Government before the International Court of Justice, see Jurisdiction and
Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (Belgium v. Switzerland).
According to the Belgian Government, Swiss courts, and in particular, the Federal Supreme
Court, in breach of this Convention, refused to recognize the future Belgian court decisions
related to the consequences of the bankruptcy of Sabena (the former Belgian national airline
had been acquired by the Swiss SAirGroup (formerly Swissair)). This case involved a number
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types of integration agreements (agreements that refer to certain aspects of
the EU acquis and which Switzerland, to a certain extent, is prepared to
respect), are briefly examined.
IV. DIFFERENT TYPES OF INTEGRATION AGREEMENTS: THE QUESTION OF
REFERENCE TO EU LAW AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF EU LAW
Explicit references to integration of the EU acquis, whereby a third party
agrees to apply the acquis, remain very rare in bilateral agreements between
the EU and third countries, which is also the case in relations with
Switzerland. Nevertheless, at least four types of agreements can be
identified that have, to some extent, such an integration dimension.
Strangely enough, they all follow a different pattern of integration. In this
context, the following agreements can be discussed: the Agreement on the
Free Movement of Persons,56 the Agreement on Air Transport,57 the
Agreement on Customs Security,58 and the Agreements on the Association to
the Schengen/Dublin Acquis.59

of important procedural and substantive law questions which cannot be examined here but it
also raised the interesting issue whether and to what extent an EU Member State could bring a
case before the International Court of Justice against a non-EU Member State for a matter
which had at least in part also an EU law dimension. The 1988 Lugano Convention had
extended the 1968 Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments in
Civil and Commercial Matters to Iceland, Norway, and Switzerland, Sept. 27, 1968, O.J. (L
299) 32, and was subsequently revised in order to align the 1988 Lugano Convention with the
2000 EU Regulation on Jurisdiction and the Recognition of Enforcement of Judgments in
Civil and Commercial Matters, Council Regulation (EC) 44/2001, Dec. 22, 2000. See Council
Decision of 27 November 2008 Concerning the Conclusion of the Convention on Jurisdiction
and Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, 2009 O.J.
(L 147) 1. However, by Order of April 5, 2011, the International Court of Justice removed the
case because the Belgian Government had informed the Court that “in concert with the
Commission of the European Union” it wanted to discontinue the proceedings. Press Release,
Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (Belgium v.
Switzerland), ICJ, No 2011/11 (Apr. 12, 2011). Whatever the outcome about jurisdiction
might have been if the case had continued, it provides an illustration of the sometimes high
degree of sensitivity and complexity of the relationship of EU Member States with
Switzerland.
56
Agreement on the Free Movement of Persons, supra note 21.
57
Agreement Between the European Community and the Swiss Confederation on Air
Transport, 2002 O.J. (L 114) 73 [hereinafter Agreement on Air Transport].
58
Agreement Between the European Community and the Swiss Confederation on the
Simplification of Inspections and Formalities in Respect of the Carriage of Goods and on
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A. Agreement on the Free Movement of Persons
The Agreement on the Free Movement of Persons, which is the
masterpiece of the Bilaterals I, has a general integration provision that
details the following: “In order to attain the objectives pursued by this
Agreement, the Contracting Parties shall take all measures necessary to
ensure that rights and obligations equivalent to those contained in the legal
acts of the European Community to which reference is made are applied in
relations between them.”60 The Agreement further stipulates that, insofar as
the Agreement involves concepts of Community law, “account shall be taken
of relevant case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Communities
prior to the date of its signature.”61 However, as one of its major
weaknesses, the Agreement remains vague on judicial developments
subsequent to its signing. Relevant case-law posterior to the date of
signature shall be brought to Switzerland’s attention and “[t]o ensure that the
Agreement works properly, the Joint Committee shall, at the request of either
Contracting Party, determine the implications of such case-law.”62 Through
the Joint Committee, Switzerland is to be informed of the EU’s process of
adapting draft amendments to its domestic legislation or as soon as there is a
change in the case-law.63
If a Contracting Party initiates the process of adopting a draft amendment
to its domestic legislation, or as soon as there is a change in the case-law of
authorities against whose decision there is no judicial remedy under domestic
law, it shall inform the other Contracting Party through the Joint
Committee.64 The Committee will then hold an exchange of views.65 This
soft approach also governs the procedure regarding settlement of disputes
Customs Security Measures, June 25, 2009, 2009 O.J. (L 199) 24 [hereinafter Agreement on
Customs Security].
59
Agreement on the Association to the Schengen Acquis, Oct. 26, 2004, 2008 O.J. (L 53) 1;
Agreement on the Association to the Dublin Acquis, Oct. 26, 2004, 2008 O.J. (L 53) 5.
60
Agreement on the Free Movement of Persons, supra note 21, art. 16, para. 1 (emphasis
added). For more details on the reference to Community Law in the Agreement on the Free
Movement of Persons, see the excellent study by ALVARO BORGHI, LA LIBRE CIRCULATION
DES PERSONNES ENTRE LA SUISSE ET L’UE: COMMENTAIRE ARTICLE PAR ARTICLE DE L’ACCORD
DU 21 JUIN 1999, at 311–31 (2010).
61
Agreement on the Free Movement of Persons, supra note 21, art. 16, para. 2.
62
Id.
63
Id.
64
Id. art. 17, para. 1.
65
Id. para. 2.
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before the Joint Committee.66 The Joint Committee will endeavor to find an
acceptable solution and may settle the dispute,67 but the Agreement remains
silent on what needs to be done if a dispute concerning the interpretation or
application of the Agreement persists and that is, at least for the EU,
precisely one of the major weaknesses of this Agreement.68
The Swiss Federal Supreme Court (“Tribunal fédéral”), the highest
judicial authority in Switzerland, holds the opinion that the Agreement on the
Free Movement of Persons only partly applies the EU acquis regarding free
movement of persons.69 This partial application of EU law results from the
fact that Switzerland does not fully and completely participate in the EU’s
Internal Market. Consequently, judgments of the European Court of Justice
based on concepts or on arguments that go beyond the framework, as
established in the Agreement, cannot as such be transposed in the Swiss legal
order.70 Borghi provides a number of illustrations where divergences may
occur, and he mentions, inter alia, the European Court’s case-law regarding
European citizenship and the impact of Council Directive 2004/38/EC of
April 29, 2004, on the right of citizens of the Union and their family
members to move freely and reside freely within the territory of the Member
States.71 “Free movement” in this Directive is partly based on the notion of
“European citizenship,” and consequently, is conceptually not identical to the
“free movement” concept in the Agreement between the EU and
Switzerland.72 Certainly, the Swiss Federal Supreme Court is always entitled
but not obliged to find inspiration for its own case law in rulings of the
European Court of Justice which are posterior to the date of signature of the
Agreement on the Free Movement of Persons. This is exactly what
happened in an important judgment on September 29, 2009, where the Swiss
Federal Supreme Court, after confirming that it was not legally bound by a
ruling of the European Court of Justice posterior to the signature of the
66

Id. art. 14.
Id. art. 19.
68
See infra p. 745.
69
ATF 130 II 113 of 19 December 2003, para. 6.2, available at http://www.servat.unibe.ch/
dfr/bge/c2130113.html.
70
In the French version, this reads as follows: “[L]es arrêts de la Cour de justice fondés sur
les notions ou des considérations dépassant ce cadre relativement étroit ne sauraient donc,
sans autre examen, être transposés dans l’ordre juridique suisse.”
71
Council Directive 2004/38, Right of Citizens of the Union and their Family Members to
Move and Reside Freely Within the Territory of the Member States, 2004 O.J. (L 158) 77.
72
See BORGHI, supra note 60, at 318–21, 338–39.
67
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Agreement on the Free Movement of Persons, nevertheless opted in favor of
the European Court’s approach, and relied extensively on the Metock ruling
of May 11, 2009, of the European Court, which had applied Directive
2004/38/EC to all family members who accompany or join their Unioncitizen spouse (thus not permitting the host Member State to maintain the
requirement of prior lawful residence in another Member State before
arriving in the host Member State).73 In doing so, the Swiss Federal
Supreme Court reversed its previous interpretation which imposed a
condition of prior lawful residency in an EU Member State on family
members of an EU national in Switzerland to qualify for residency in
Switzerland. The Swiss Federal Supreme Court also emphasized that
existing Swiss law on family unification did not impose such a condition
and, consequently, its previous case law could be re-examined.74
The lack of any dynamic character in the Agreement on the Free
Movement of Persons75 is one of the causes of the growing EU sensitivity.
The Agreement concerns one of the major aspects of the Internal Market, but
there is nevertheless a large degree of autonomy left for Switzerland
73

Case C-127/08, Metock v. Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform, 2008 E.C.R. I6809.
74
See Judgments of the Federal Supreme Court ATF 2C_196/2009 of 29 September 2009,
available at http://jumpcgi.bger.ch/cgi-bin/JumpCGI?id=29.09.2009_2C_196/2009; see also
ATF 2C_760/2009 of 17 April 2010, available at http://jumpcgi.bger.ch/cgi-bin/JumpCGI?id
=17.04.2010_2C_760/2009.
75
In various recent rulings, the European Court of Justice has drawn attention to the fact
that Switzerland, with its rejection of the EEA, refused to become economically integrated
with the EU’s Internal Market. Consequently, Internal Market-related interpretations cannot
be automatically transposed to bilateral agreements with Switzerland, including the
Agreement on the Free Movement of Persons, unless these agreements contain an express
provision for such interpretations. See Case C-351/08, Grimme v. Deutsche AngestelltenKrankenkasse, 2009 E.C.R. I-10777; Case C-541/08, Fokus Invest v. FinanzierungsberatungImmobilientreuhand und Anlageberatung GmbH (FIAG), 2010 E.C.R. I-1025; Case C-70/09,
Hengartner and Gasser v. Landesregierung Vorarlberg, not yet reported. In his Opinion in
Hengartner and Gasser, Advocate General Jääskinin observed that the coverage of the
Agreement on the Free Movement of Persons “is limited by the specific nature of its
provisions and because it contains provisions designed to limit or to clarify its material or
temporal scope.” These limitations “are foreign to European Union law.” In this respect he
referred more specifically to Article 16, paragraph 2, of the Agreement limiting the obligation
of Swiss courts to take account of relevant case law of the European Court prior to the
signature of the Agreement, see Point 46. The interpretation provided by the Court and
Advocate General seems correct and is indeed a consequence of the partial integration
approach as established in the Agreement on the Free Movement of Persons. On the lack of
dynamic character in the Agreement, see also Kaddous, supra note 1, at 242.
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regarding legislative and judicial developments of the EU acquis, and
conformity with development of EU law after the signature of the Agreement
depends largely on “goodwill” of the Swiss authorities, including that of
Swiss courts.
B. Agreement on Air Transport
The Agreement on Air Transport, as already mentioned, also belongs to
the group of agreements of the Bilaterals I. The preamble recalls that it is
the desire of the Contracting Parties, “in full deference to the independence
of the courts,” to prevent divergent interpretations “and to arrive at as
uniform an interpretation as possible of the provisions of this Agreement and
the corresponding provisions of Community law which are substantially
reproduced in this Agreement.”76
Article 1, paragraph 2 of the Agreement stipulates:
Insofar as they are identical in substance to corresponding rules
of the EC Treaty and to acts adopted in application of that
Treaty, . . . provisions [in this Agreement] shall, in their
implementation and application, be interpreted in conformity
with the relevant rulings and decisions of the Court of Justice
and the Commission of the European Communities given prior
to the date of signature of this Agreement.77
For rulings and decisions given after the date of signature of the
Agreement, they “shall be communicated to Switzerland.”78 The Joint
Committee, at the request of one of the Parties, may be asked to intervene,
but there is a considerable degree of legal uncertainty if the incompatibility
persists and the procedure foreseen under Article 22 of the Agreement might
be applied. Before going into this procedure it should also be mentioned that
Article 23 of the Agreement lays down a complicated procedure for “new
legislation.”79 Experts from the other Contracting Party are consulted when
new legislation is being drafted.80 For the EU, this means that Switzerland
76
77
78
79
80

Agreement on Air Transport, supra note 57.
Id. art. 1, para. 2.
Id.
Id. art. 23.
Id. para. 2.
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may participate in the “decision-shaping.” Of course, also here, “decisionmaking” in the EU remains a matter for the EU institutions exclusively. As
soon as the EU adopts an amendment of its acquis covered by the
Agreement, it informs the other Contracting Party, and the latter may ask to
hold an exchange of views in the Joint Committee within six weeks on the
implications of the amendments of the acquis.81 If the Joint Committee is
able to take a decision (but such a decision implies mutual agreement
between the Parties) then this will be binding upon the Parties.82 If the Joint
Committee does not take a decision on an issue that has been referred to it
within six months, then “the Contracting Parties may take appropriate
temporary safeguard measures under Article 31 for a period not exceeding
six months.”83 Of course, it is important to recall in this context that the
Agreement on Air Transport is part of the Bilaterals I, and consequently the
prospect of a possible termination of the Agreement should be avoided since
it could trigger the “guillotine clause.” Finally, it must also be noted that
when a dispute is brought before the Joint Committee concerning the
interpretation or application of the Agreement, the Joint Committee has no
jurisdiction regarding “questions which are within the exclusive competence
of the Court of Justice of the European Communities under Article 20.”84
Article 20 is indeed a special provision in this Agreement, providing for
exclusive competence for the Court of Justice of the European Communities
regarding “all questions concerning the validity of decisions of the
institutions of the Community taken on the basis of their competences under
this Agreement.”85 Granting exclusive competence to the European Court of
Justice in a bilateral agreement with a third State is, understandably, very
rare.86 After all, why should a third country accept exclusive jurisdiction of
81

Id. para. 3.
Id. art. 22, para. 1.
83
Id. para. 5. Article 31 holds that if one of the Contracting Parties refuses to comply with
obligations under this Agreement, the other Party “may . . . take appropriate temporary
safeguard measures in order to maintain the balance of this Agreement.” Id. art. 31.
84
Id. art. 29.
85
Id. art. 20.
86
See, e.g., Monetary Agreement Between the EU and the Vatican City State, 2010 O.J.
(C 28) 13. In this agreement, the Court of Justice is given exclusive jurisdiction to settle
disputes between the parties that may arise from the application of the Agreement and cannot
be settled by the Joint Committee. Id. art. 10, para. 1. This Agreement goes further than the
Agreement on Air Transport with Switzerland regarding the exclusive jurisdiction of the
European Court of Justice. The Agreement with the Vatican City State also provides that the
EU or the Vatican City State may bring the matter before the Court of Justice if the other
82
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the other party’s court to settle questions of interpretation and application
concerning an agreement between that third party and the EU? The possible
answer why this happened in the Agreement with Switzerland is the farreaching integration dimension of that agreement, which simply cannot allow
divergences in interpretation and application. To date, it is the only bilateral
agreement where Switzerland made such an unusual and far-reaching
concession. Additionally, within the Agreement, Switzerland also accepted
that “the Community institutions shall enjoy the powers granted to them
under the provisions of the regulations and directives whose application is
explicitly confirmed in the Annex,”87 but “in cases where Switzerland has
taken or envisages taking measures of an environmental nature under either
Article 8(2) or 9 of Council Regulation (EEC) No 2408/92, the Joint
Committee, upon request by one of the Contracting Parties, shall decide
whether those measures are in conformity with this Agreement.”88
It is on the basis of this Agreement that Switzerland has submitted a
complaint to the European Commission regarding certain air traffic rules
adopted by Germany that seriously affect landing and take-off at Zurich
Airport, as well as low-altitude flights over the German territory under
normal weather conditions.89 The Commission decided, however, that

Party has not fulfilled an obligation under this Agreement. Id. art. 10, para. 2. The judgment
of the Court shall be binding on the Parties “which shall take the necessary measures to
comply with the judgment within a period to be decided by the Court in its judgment.” Id. In
other words, the EU can bring an action before the Court of Justice against the Vatican City
State and the judgment of the Court is binding on the Parties. Also the Monetary Agreement
between the EU and the Principality of Andorra attributes exclusive jurisdiction to the
European Court of Justice for settling disputes between the parties arising from the application
for the Agreement. Id. para. 1. Switzerland’s acceptance in the Agreement on Air Transport
of the Court’s jurisdiction does not imply the possibility of direct actions against Switzerland;
the Court’s jurisdiction is limited to question concerning validity of decision of EU
institutions. Also the new Monetary Agreement with Monaco signed on 29 November 2011
(not yet published), replacing the 2001 Monetary Agreement, grants exclusive jurisdiction to
the European Court of Justice for disputes between the parties which cannot be solved by the
Joint Committee established by the Agreement (art. 12). The main reason why in these
agreements the States concerned have accepted the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice has to
do with the specific nature of such agreements: the contracting parties of the EU, while not
being EU Member States of the Eurozone, nevertheless use the euro as their official currency.
Consequently, they have to respect the rules of the relevant EU acquis. Id.
87
Agreement on Air Transport, supra note 57, art. 18, para. 2.
88
Id.
89
For a discussion of the German complaint, see Commission Decision 2004/12 EC of 5
December 2003, 2004 O.J. (L 4) 13.
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Germany could maintain its national rules,90 and Switzerland challenged this
decision before the Court of Justice. However, as a result of an internal
reorganization of the European Court’s procedures it was the General Court
(before the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty called “Court of First
Instance,” and not the European Court of Justice which on September 9,
2010 decided to uphold the Commission’s decision allowing Germany to
continue applying its restrictive national rules).91 While a discussion of the
substantive law part of the ruling is beyond the scope of this Article, one
aspect of the judgment of the General Court needs further comment.
Notwithstanding the fact that in the Agreement the “Court of Justice of the
European Communities” was explicitly given exclusive jurisdiction, the
Court decided that Switzerland’s action for annulment had to be brought
before the “Court of First Instance” (now the General Court). In its Order on
July 14, 2005,92 the Court observed that the expression “Court of Justice of
the European Communities” used in Article 20 of the Agreement with
Switzerland should be read as referring to “the Court” as a “Community
institution,” which includes the Court of Justice as well as the Court of First
Instance.93 This is a very astonishing interpretation of Article 20 of the
Agreement and it is doubtful that this is the correct approach. The question
was not—contrary to what the Court’s Order implies—whether Switzerland
had to be assimilated to Member States or to a “legal person” in the context
of Article 230(4) of the Treaty Establishing the European Community (now

90

Id.
Case T-319/05, Switzerland v. Commission, 2006 E.C.R. II-2073. Switzerland decided
to appeal against the ruling of the General Court and the case is now pending before the Court
of Justice. See Département Fédéral de l’Environnement, des Transports, de l’Énergie et de la
Communication, Restrictions de vol: le Conseil fédéral fait recours contre l’arrêt du Tribunal
de l’UE, SWISS CONFEDERATION (Oct. 13, 2010), http://www.bazl.admin.ch/aktuell/medienin
formation/00024/index.html?lang=fr&msg-id=35563.
92
A Notice is published in the Official Journal of the EU that Case C-70/04 is referred to
the Court of First Instance of the European Communities (the text of the Order is only
available in French). Order of the Court of 14 July 2005, 2005 O.J. (C 296) 8.
93
The French version reads as follows: “[A] supposer même que, ainsi que le soutient la
Commission, l’article 20 de l’accord CE-Suisse sur le transport aérien vise à conférer à la Cour
de nouvelles competences, dont celle de connaître du présent recours, rien ne s’oppose à ce que
les termes « Cour de justice des Communautés européennes » figurant à cet article soient
interprétés comme se référant à la Cour en tant qu’institution communautaire qui comprend la
Cour et le Tribunal” (emphasis added), Order of the Court of 14 July 2005, supra note 92,
para. 18
91
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Article 263 TFEU).94 Switzerland is not a Member State of the Union, and,
as mentioned before, as a third State Switzerland accepted exclusive
jurisdiction of the “Court of Justice of the European Communities” and not
the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance. It is more than likely that for
Switzerland, the term “Court of Justice of the European Communities” meant
nothing else than what it was supposed to mean; that is, “the Court of
Justice” and not another court of the Union. Replacing the “Court of Justice
of the European Communities,” as formulated in the Agreement, by another
court whose decisions moreover are subject to possible appeal is a unilateral
move that cannot be justified on the basis of the terms and spirit of the
Agreement and that clearly has negative effects for Switzerland.
C. Agreement on Simplification of Inspections and Formalities in Respect
of Carriage of Goods and Customs Security Measures
In 1990, Switzerland concluded an agreement on the simplification of
inspections and formalities in respect of the carriage of goods.95 However, in
2009, the need to include an additional chapter on customs security led to a
new consolidated agreement with a strong integration dimension.96
This is clear from the wording of the preamble of the new Agreement,
which holds that the Contracting Parties “undertake to guarantee on their
respective territories an equivalent level of security through measures based
on legislation in force in the Community.”97 If the EU draws up new
legislation in an area covered by the Agreement, the opinion of Swiss experts
is sought informally. In the phase prior to the adaptation of the EU act, the
Contracting Parties may request consultation in the Joint Committee.98 The
customs security measures are contained in Chapter III of the Agreement and
are considered as binding acquis for Switzerland. If amendments are needed
to take account of the development of EU legislation, “[they] shall be
94
The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union establishes the jurisdiction of the
Court of Justice of the EU for actions brought against acts of EU institutions; such actions can
be brought by Member States, EU institutions, and under certain conditions, by any natural or
legal person. TFEU art. 263.
95
Agreement Between the European Economic Community and the Swiss Confederation
on the Simplification of Inspections and Formalities in Respect of the Carriage of Goods,
1990 O.J. (L 116) 19.
96
Agreement on Customs Security, supra note 58.
97
Id. (emphasis added).
98
Id. art. 22, para. 3.
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decided as soon as possible so that they can be implemented at the same time
as the amendments to the EU legislation in compliance with the internal
procedures of the Contracting Parties.”99 If a decision cannot be adopted for
a simultaneous implementation, the amendments provided for in the draft
decision shall nevertheless be implemented provisionally where possible.100
The Agreement explicitly allows a Contracting Party to take appropriate
“rebalancing measures,” including suspension of the Agreement, if it finds
that the other Contracting Party does not adhere to its conditions or if the
equivalence of the Contracting Party’s customs security measures is no
longer assured.101 If the effectiveness of customs security is at stake,
provisional protective measures may be taken without prior consultation.102
Scope and duration of such measures shall be limited to what is necessary to
remedy the situation and to secure a fair balance of rights and obligations.103
A Contracting Party may ask the Joint Committee to hold consultations about
the proportionality of the rebalancing measures and, where appropriate, may
decide to submit a dispute on the matter to arbitration.104 The Agreement
further stipulates that the question submitted for arbitration must concern the
question of proportionality and that no question of interpretation of
provisions of the Agreement that are identical to corresponding provisions of
EU law may be resolved within this framework.105 An arbitration procedure
is worked out in Annex III to the Agreement.106 Each of the Parties shall
appoint one arbitrator and the two arbitrators shall by common agreement
appoint a third arbitrator who shall not be a national of either of the
Contracting Parties.107 If no agreement can be reached, the third arbitrator
shall be chosen from a list established by the Joint Committee.108
Switzerland considers that the integration mechanisms in this Agreement
demonstrate, on the one hand, a firm willingness on its part to move forward
in the direction of acceptance and further development of the EU acquis,

99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108

Id. para. 4.
Id.
Id. art. 29, para. 1.
Id.
Id. para. 3.
Id.
Id.
Id. Annex III.
Id.
Id.
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while nevertheless, preserving the essentials of Swiss autonomy.109
Switzerland also finds that this Agreement is an indication that, if needed,
the EU is prepared to accept “a pragmatic approach”110 in its relations with
Switzerland. However, it is doubtful that the specific arrangements in this
(highly technical) Agreement might serve as a source of inspiration for other
integration agreements with Switzerland.
D. Agreements on the Association to the Schengen/Dublin Acquis
Switzerland’s commitment to accept the development of the acquis is
probably the most advanced in the association agreements to the
Schengen/Dublin Conventions; these two agreements provide examples of
“deep integration.” Certainly, Switzerland is allowed to participate in the
decision-shaping of the development of the relevant acquis, but not in the
decisionmaking. The adoption of new acts or measures is reserved to the
competent institutions of the European Union, and they enter into force
simultaneously for the European Union, its Member States, and for
Switzerland. If Switzerland cannot implement the development of the acquis
on a provisional basis and if this disrupts the operation of the
Schengen/Dublin co-operation, the situation is examined by the Mixed
Committee. If necessary, the EU is entitled to take proportionate and
appropriate measures against Switzerland to ensure that the Schengen/Dublin
co-operation continues to operate smoothly.111 Where Switzerland is unable
to comply with the acts taken by the EU the Agreement shall be considered
terminated, unless the Mixed Committee decides otherwise.
The Mixed Committee also keeps under constant review developments in
the case-law of the European Court of Justice.112 If a substantial divergence
between the case-law of the Court of Justice and that of Swiss courts persists,
or if a substantial divergence between authorities of the Member States
concerned and the Swiss authorities in the application of the
Schengen/Dublin acquis persists, the matter may be brought before the
109

See RAPPORT DU CONSEIL FÉDÉRAL SUR L’ÉVALUATION DE LA POLITIQUE EUROPÉENNE DE
supra note 41, at 38–39.
110
See id. at 46–47, 101.
111
Agreement on the Association to the Schengen Acquis, supra note 59, art. 7, para. 2(b);
Agreement on the Association to the Dublin Acquis, supra note 59, art. 4, para. 4.
112
Agreement on the Association to the Schengen Acquis, supra note 59, art. 8, para. 1;
Agreement on the Association to Dublin Acquis, supra note 59, art. 5, para. 1.
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Mixed Committee. If no solution is found within two months, following the
procedure in the Agreement, then the matter is entered as a matter of dispute
on the agenda of the Mixed Committee. If no solution can be found within
90 days—this deadline can be extended by 30 days with a view to reaching a
final settlement—the Agreement “shall be terminated six months after the
expiry of the 30-day period.”113 There is no further dispute settlement
mechanism foreseen in this hypothesis (there is no compensation or
arbitration).
These aforementioned Agreements are the most far-reaching illustrations
of integration agreements and of incorporation of the acquis, including as a
sanction if divergence persists, the termination of the agreement.
V. CONCLUSION
As shown in this Article, the relations between the EU and Switzerland
are extremely intense and they have been beneficial for both the EU as well
as Switzerland. Switzerland is a very important and reliable partner of the
EU. This does not need further explanation. However, it is also true that the
bilateral relations, as they have developed over the years, have become
increasingly complicated and some of the issues that have arisen, such as
those on the cantonal company tax regimes, have yet to be solved. One of
the major difficulties in the bilateral relations involving Switzerland stems
from the operation of the complex institutional labyrinth, as a result of the
many bilateral agreements that penetrate into the EU’s core activity—that is,
the Internal Market. The examination of the various integration agreements
with Switzerland demonstrates that the existing mechanisms have not been
able to guarantee an adequate legal framework to cope with the development
of the acquis. Too many loopholes and uncertainties remain in the examined
agreements, and it is difficult to escape the impression that the homogeneity
of the Internal Market depends too much on goodwill. This may be the main
explanation for the EU’s growing call for a horizontal solution whereby,
inter alia, a general institutional framework is established. It is thought that
such a move could considerably enhance legal certainty and create greater
transparency.

113
Agreement on the Association to the Schengen Acquis, supra note 59, art. 10; Agreement
on the Association to the Dublin Acquis, supra note 59, art. 7.
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Switzerland, to the extent that it becomes part of large segments of the
EU’s Internal Market, is increasingly aware that this move creates specific
obligations, and is in favor of “a comprehensive and coordinated approach”
to the Switzerland-EU relations.114 An Internal Market, and certainly that of
the EU, cannot function à la carte; therefore, as suggested in the Report of
the Federal Council of September 17, 2010,115 Switzerland may be prepared
to pay, under certain conditions as a result of exercising its sovereignty, a
price if divergences from the EU acquis occur and persist. As repeatedly
mentioned, Switzerland also insists that it is necessary to find a formula
combining Switzerland’s adequate participation in decision-making and a
respect for Switzerland’s sovereignty. In addition, Switzerland is also in
favor of more adequate arbitration mechanisms. However, it is not evident
that these demands can easily be satisfied in so far as they regard compliance
with substantive areas of the Internal Market acquis. The concept of
compensatory measures, which seems borrowed from international economic
law practice, is not the most appropriate mechanism to solve the question of
divergences in the development of the law regarding integration agreements
which concern the Internal Market. It is true that the EEA Agreement itself
contains the possibility of safeguard measures in order to remedy possible
persisting imbalances in the application of the acquis, but so far this
hypothesis has never occurred. If it were ever to occur, then the EEA would
likely be in serious danger.
Consequently, solutions regarding the
development of the law as laid down in the Agreement on customs security
and which seem to have a preference of the Swiss side—also because these
involve a detailed arbitration clause (something which is lacking in the other
bilateral agreements)—cannot be a workable model for the further
integration of Switzerland in the Internal Market.
Another sensitive aspect that needs a solution is the question of
supervision of the bilateral commitments. The EU would likely favor a
solution whereby the European Court of Justice has jurisdiction to settle
disputes on the interpretation and application of the bilateral agreements;
however, this idea, understandably, is not very popular in Switzerland, and
114
Herman Van Rompuy, President, European Council, Statement Following His Meeting
with Micheline Calmy-Rey, President, Switz., PCE 031/11 (Feb. 8, 2011), available at http://
www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/119222.pdf (quoting the view
of the Swiss President).
115
RAPPORT DU CONSEIL FÉDÉRAL SUR L’EVALUATION DE LA POLITIQUE EUROPÉENNE DE LA
SUISSE, supra note 41.
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the recent handling of the only precedent of the Luxembourg Court’s
jurisdiction in the Agreement on Air Transport, obliging Switzerland to
initiate proceedings against the Commission first before the Court of First
Instance (now General Court) instead of before the Court of Justice, will not
contribute to promote this option. Unfortunately, in an exclusive bilateral
framework, as is the case with Switzerland, there are not many other
alternatives for an adequate and transparent supervision of Switzerland’s
commitments toward the Internal Market acquis. The idea that the EFTA
Surveillance Authority and EFTA Court could be used for this purpose
seems at first difficult to contemplate—unless of course Switzerland
becomes a member of the EEA or unless an intra-EFTA arrangement
provides sufficient guarantees to the EU for a transparent supervision of and
enforcement by Switzerland of the Internal Market acquis. It may perhaps
be possible to find a procedural framework that incorporates Switzerland for
its Internal Market-related commitments in the EEA surveillance system.
After all, the EU’s Internal Market is also that of the EEA, and Switzerland
is a member of EFTA.
It is true that the various questions raised regarding the adaptation to the
development of the acquis would certainly be handled most efficiently if
Switzerland were to accede to the EEA or the EU. But this is a highly
political matter that depends heavily on the position of the Swiss population.
If for one reason or another neither of these options is possible, then it will
be necessary for Switzerland to contemplate workable integration models,
which do not jeopardize the full and efficient application of the Internal
Market, and which provide adequate legal certainty. This, inevitably, has a
cost, in terms of sovereignty and independence—two of the main and almost
magic concepts in the Swiss foreign policy discourse.116
116
The great sensitivity of this debate is also demonstrated by the intensity of the controversy
which has erupted in Switzerland after the completion of this contribution. See for example the
critical comments by Urs Paul Engeler, Diskrete Umgehungsmanöver, DIE WELTWOCHE (2001),
http://www.weltwoche.ch/ausgaben/2011-51/bundesrat-diskrete-umgehungsmanoever-die-welt
woche-ausgabe-512011.html with links to the opinion of the Verwaltungskommission of the
Federal Supreme Court of 29 June 2011 and to the opinion of Professor Daniel Thürer
(Gutachten über mögliche Formen der Umzetzung und Anwendung der Bilateralen Abkommen)
of July 7, 2011 (these opinions have been prepared at the request of the Federal Council); see
also the comments by Carl Baudenbacher, “Helvetische Lösung” mit der EU kaum möglich,
NEUE ZÜRCHER ZEITUNG (Jan. 3, 2012), who argues that “a Swiss solution” to the approach of
the relations with the EU is not realistic and that reorientation by Switzerland towards the EEA
model should be seen as a valid option (if accession to the EU is not possible).

